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GUN CONTROL THROUGH TORT LAW
Richard C. Ausness*
INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to respond to an article by Professor Andrew Jay
McClurg that recently appeared in the Florida Law Review.1 In this
article, the author, a longtime advocate of firearms regulation,2 argues
that owners and commercial sellers of firearms who negligently fail to
secure them against theft should be held liable when persons are killed or
injured by firearms used in the commission of a crime.3
In the past, believing that existing federal and state laws were
inadequate to halt the spread of gun-related deaths and injuries,
proponents of stricter gun control measures proposed a number of tort
liability theories to supplement these laws. I will briefly review some of
these theories in order to provide a background for my discussion of
Professor McClurg’s proposal. In the early days, when the emphasis was
on controlling cheap handguns known as “Saturday Night Specials,” gun
control advocates urged that these firearms be subjected to strict products
liability.4 However, the strict liability approach usually failed because
plaintiffs were unable to prove that the handguns in question were
defective.5 Proponents of gun control then endorsed a broad risk-utility
or product category liability theory, which characterized products as
defective if their overall social costs outweighed their social benefits.6

* Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law.
University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968 University of Florida; LL.M. Yale Law School.
1. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Second Amendment Right to be Negligent, 68 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (2016).
2. See, e.g., ANDREW JAY MCCLURG & BRANNON P. DENNING, GUNS AND THE LAW: CASES,
PROBLEMS AND EXPLANATION (2016); GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS (Andrew Jay McClurg,
David B. Kopel & Brannon P. Denning eds. 2002); Andrew Jay McClurg, In Search of the Golden
Mean in the Gun Debate, 58 HOWARD L.J. 779 (2015); Andrew Jay McClurg, Firearms Policy
and the Black Community: Rejecting the “Wouldn’t You Want a Gun If Attacked?” Argument, 45
CONN. L. REV. 1773 (2013).
3. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 47.
4. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Strict Liability for Handgun Manufacturers: A Reply to
Professor Oliver, 14 U. ARK.-LITTLE ROCK L.J. 511, 525 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210–11 (N.D. Tex.
1985); Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983); Penelas v. Arms Tech.,
Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
6. See Carl Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products
Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 9 (1995); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product
Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1429, 1454 (1994); Michael J. Toke, Note, Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable
Designs: Why the Comment d Caveat Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1185 (1996).
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After some initial successes,7 this theory was also rejected.8 Finally, some
gun control proponents urged courts to treat handgun use as an
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity,9 but this suggestion was
not particularly well received either.10
Recently, the focus has shifted from cheap handguns to military-style
assault rifles.11 This, in turn, has led gun control advocates to recast
existing liability theories such as negligent entrustment and public
nuisance and to formulate new ones such as negligent marketing.
Negligent entrustment imposes liability on one who supplies a product to
another when he or she has reason to suspect that the recipient will not be
able to use it safely.12 Another theory is public nuisance,13 which allows

7. See Kelly v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Md. 1985); see also Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986); O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d
298, 306 (N.J. 1983).
8. See Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533–34 (11th Cir. 1986);
Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d
1250, 1273–74 (5th Cir. 1985); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987),
aff’d, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987). Many commentators were also critical. See, e.g., Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical
Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 398 (1995); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The
Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1266–67 (1991).
9. See John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability
Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 537, 544, 547 (1983); Andrew Jay McClurg, Handguns as
Products Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se, 13 U. ARK.-LITTLE ROCK L.J. 599, 601, 603, 604
(1991); Andrew O. Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 370 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Shipman, 791 F.2d at 1534; Moore, 789 F.2d at 1328; Perkins, 762 F.2d at
1268; Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Caveny v.
Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 531 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1988);
Armijo, 656 F. Supp. at 775, aff’d, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Hammond v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 565 A.2d 558, 563 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147; Knott v.
Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664–65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). Contra Richman v.
Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 208 (E.D. La. 1983).
11. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 152 & nn.2–3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1999), rev’d, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). This cases involved the TEC-9 and the TEC-DC9. These
military-style semi-automatic weapons were designed to accept fifty-round magazines and were
equipped with “barrel shrouds” that facilitated spray fire. In addition, the barrels were threaded in
order to accept silencers or flash suppressors. The weapons were compact and could be easily
broken down and concealed. Furthermore, they were fitted with a “Hell Fire” trigger mechanism
that enabled them to be fired more rapidly than other semi-automatic weapons. Finally, the TECDC9 could be easily converted to fire like an automatic weapon. See id. at 154–55.
12. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 10 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390
(AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
13. See Bhowmik et al., A Sense of Duty: Retiring the “Special Relationship” Rule and
Holding Gun Manufacturers Liable for Negligently Distributing Guns, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 42, 58 (2001); John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for
Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Experience,
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states and cities to recover from gun manufacturers for health care, law
enforcement and other expenses incurred by the government because of
the defendant’s irresponsible marketing practices.14 This theory has been
accepted in some states15 and rejected in others.16 Negligent marketing is
a novel theory that emerged during this period.17 Negligent marketing
seeks to impose liability for promotional and marketing practices that
facilitate access to guns by criminals and other unsuitable persons.18
However, so far courts have been reluctant to hold gun manufacturers or
sellers liable under this theory.19
In contrast, Professor McClurg’s liability proposal is more traditional
and narrowly focused than the approaches discussed above. In the first
place, because it is based on negligence, this liability theory requires that
the defendant be at fault in some way. Second, it does not affect gun
manufacturers at all, but instead imposes liability on gun owners and
sellers when they fail to secure their weapons properly and when this
failure enables criminals to steal guns and injure third parties while
committing violent crimes. However, I am skeptical about whether the
imposition of tort liability is the best solution to the problem of gun
violence.
I. TORT LIABILITY AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Professor McClurg correctly points out that court and legislative
bodies have generally refused to impose tort liability on owners or

52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 301 (2001); David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the
Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2000).
14. See 2 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PROD. LIAB. § 10:9 (4th
ed. 2016); Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 825, 870 (2004).
15. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 819 (N.D. Ohio 2000); District of Columbia
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 637 (D.C. 2005); City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,
801 N.E.2d 1222, 1249 (Ind. 2003); James v. Arms Tech Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ohio 2002).
16. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F.3d 415, 420–21 (3d Cir.
2002); Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540–41
(3d Cir. 2001); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16, 19 (Ga. 2001).
17. See Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An
Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 912 (2002).
18. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability Is
Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON H. LEGIS. J. 777, 778–79 (1995).
19. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v. Navegar,
Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 124, 125 (Cal. 2001); Riordan v. Int’l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1294,
1296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984);
Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664, 665 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
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commercial sellers of firearms.20 For example, no federal or state law
requires gun owners to securely store their weapons to prevent theft from
homes or motor vehicle.21 Furthermore, while the Federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco (AFT) has issued detailed
recommendations to commercial sellers regarding the proper storage of
firearms, none of these recommendations are mandatory.22
Moreover, as Professor McClurg observes, courts have also been
reluctant to impose tort liability on either gun owners or commercial
sellers for failing to secure firearms against theft.23 Although courts have
declared firearms to be dangerous and have urged owners to exercise the
highest degree of care when storing and using them,24 they usually stop
short of holding gun owners and commercial sellers liable for negligent
storage of firearms by invoking “those wayward twins of different
mothers, duty and proximate cause, along with their shady cousin,
foreseeability.”25 Valentine v. On Target, Inc.26 is illustrative of the duty
analysis. In that case, an unknown assailant used a gun stolen from the
defendant gun store to murder the decedent.27 The court accused the
plaintiff of seeking to impose a duty on the defendant to protect the world
at large from criminal activity—a duty which it felt would impose a
“tremendous burden” on gun dealers while providing only a hypothetical
benefit to the public.28
Courts also rely on proximate cause (or the lack thereof) to protect
gun owners and sellers from liability. When a court decides a case on
proximate cause grounds, it usually considers whether the defendant’s
negligent conduct was a foreseeable cause of the plaintiff’s injury. In such
20. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 4–6.
21. See id. at 17. Congress did enact the Child Safety Lock Act in 2005, which requires gun
makers and sellers to furnish a secure storage or safety device to prevent children from gaining
access to firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (34) (A), (B), (C) (2012). However, this statute is
concerned with preventing harm to children rather than preventing the theft of firearms. See
McClurg, supra note 1, at 18. In addition, about twenty-five states have enacted child access
prevention (CAP) laws, which impose criminal liability on gun owners who negligently store their
firearms if this enables a child to obtain access to a weapon and cause him to himself or another.
See id. at 18–19.
22. See id. at 19–20. Moreover, only nine states and the District of Columbia impose
security requirements on gun dealers. Id. at 20 n.91.
23. See id. at 23; see also Jones v. Secord, 684 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2012); Bridges v. Parish,
742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (N.C. 2013).
24. See Bridges v. Dahl, 108 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1939); Reida v. Lund, 96 Cal. Rptr.
102, 105 (Ct. App. 1971); Jacobs v. Tyson, 407 S.E.2d 62, 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Long v. Turk,
962 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Kan. 1998); Estate of Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 671 (Mont. 1996);
Stoelting v. Hauck, 159 A.2d 385, 389 (N.J. 1960); Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 18 S.E.2d
412, 417 (N.C. 1942).
25. McClurg, supra note 1, at 23 (citations omitted).
26. 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999).
27. See id. at 948.
28. See id. at 951.
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cases, courts often conclude that the actions of third party criminals are
unforeseeable and, therefore, break the chain of causation, thereby
relieving the defendant of liability.29 For example, in Romero v. National
Rifle Association,30 a gun stolen from the NRA’s national headquarters
was used to murder the decedent during a robbery.31 Affirming a decision
for the defendant, the federal court of appeals declared that the events
were so “extraordinary and unforeseeable” that they constituted a
superseding cause.32
According to Professor McClurg, when courts invoke principles of
proximate cause and duty in stolen gun cases without considering the
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, they are essentially
concluding that public policy does not require gun owners and sellers to
exercise reasonable care to prevent gun thefts.33 Professor McClurg also
believes that these decisions reflect a view that imposing liability on gun
owners and sellers in these cases will have a chilling effect on gun
ownership and thereby raise Second Amendment concerns.34 However,
Professor McClurg persuasively argues that “nothing in the history nor
jurisprudence of the Second Amendment suggests, much less guarantees,
a privilege by gun sellers and owners to act unreasonably in securing
firearms from theft.”35
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR TORT LIABILITY
There are two aspects to Professor McClurg’s argument for tort
liability. First, he contends that the aggregate social harm (deaths and
injuries) attributable to gun theft justifies measures to coerce, or at least
to encourage, gun owners and sellers to take more precautions to prevent
theft. Second, the imposition of tort liability will have a sufficient
deterrent effect to achieve this goal.
A. Costs and Benefits
1. The Benefits of Reducing Gun Deaths and Injuries
Professor McClurg’s cost-benefit analysis requires a reasonably
accurate calculation of both costs and benefits. Although it seems a bit
29. See Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 749 F.2d 77, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674; Louria v. Brummett, 916 S.W.2d 929, 930–31 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995).
30. 749 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. See id. at 78.
32. See id. at 80–81.
33. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 24.
34. See id. at 29–30 (discussing McGrane v. Cline, 973 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999) and Holden v. Johnson, No. CV010811660 WL 1153739 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2005)).
35. Id. at 10.
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strange to frame it this way, the “benefits” of imposing tort liability on
gun owners and sellers would be the reduction in the costs of deaths and
injuries caused by stolen guns that would result if they were subjected to
tort liability. In order to ascertain that figure, we must determine: (1) what
these aggregate costs are; and (2) how much they would be reduced if the
tort liability option were chosen. Unfortunately, neither of these figures
are easy to determine.
Professor McClurg observes that more than 30,000 deaths36 and
80,000 nonfatal injuries37 are caused each year by firearms. Although
some of these deaths and injuries are accidental, others result from either
self-inflicted gunshots or homicides.38 According to one survey, as many
as 600,000 guns may have been stolen each year from private residences
through burglaries and other property crimes.39 In addition, thousands of
guns are stolen from commercial sellers as the result of shoplifting and
burglaries.40 Many of these stolen guns are no doubt used to commit
violent crimes resulting in deaths or injuries.41 Nevertheless, while many
of these deaths and injuries committed by criminals involve stolen
firearms,42 we cannot be sure what the actual numbers are.43 Moreover,
even if we could obtain an accurate estimate of these deaths and injuries,
we would have to “monetize” them in order to balance them with the cost
side of the equation.

36. Id. at 21 (citing Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL
STAT.
REP.,
May
8,
2013,
at
1,
11,
83
tbl.
18,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf).
37. Id. at 38 (citing Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS),
Nonfatal Injury Reports 2001–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION).
38. See id. at 21 n.97.
39. See id. at 11 (citing PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN
AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 7 (1997),
https://www.ncjrs. gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf).
40. See id. at 12 (citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2012 SUMMARY: FIREARMS REPORTED LOST AND STOLEN 10 tbl.3 (2013),
https://www.atf.gov/file/11846/download).
41. See id. at 14.
42. See id. at 13–14 and accompanying notes.
43. Professor McClurg cites a study that concluded that about 61% of all gun-related deaths
in 2010 were the result of suicides and 35% were the result of homicides. Id. at 21 n.97 (citing
Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013 at
1, 11, 83 tbl. 18, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf). The reason that the
suicide death rate is so high is because of the lethality of guns as a suicide method. In fact, guns
are the most lethal form of suicide, with an 82 percent success rate. See Lethality of Suicide
Methods, HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/means-matter/meansmatter/case-fatality/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). This also suggests that a high percentage of nonfatal gun injuries result from criminal acts.

2017]

GUN CONTROL THROUGH TORT LAW

95

2. The Costs of Tort Liability
Even if the benefits of tort liability could be determined with
reasonable certainty, the analysis would not be complete without
considering what the cost of tort liability would be. This cost could be
significant because the imposition of tort liability would potentially affect
all gun owners and sellers and result in inconvenience and out-of-pocket
expenses to secure their weapons against theft. Another potential cost is
the inability of gun owners to immediately access their weapons to defend
against robberies and burglaries.44 As in the case of benefits, the cost side
of the equation must be monetized to that both costs and benefits can be
compared using the same metrics. Unfortunately, as is the case with
benefits, many of the costs of tort liability cannot be accurately
monetized.
3. The Deterrent Effect of Tort Law
Finally, there is the question of whether tort law would actually deter
negligent conduct on the part of gun owners and sellers.45 Professor
McClurg relies on what he calls an “economic deterrence model” to
support his argument for tort liability.46 As he points out, tort rules are
intended to encourage actors to expend resources on safety up to the point
where the marginal cost of safety equals the marginal reduction in
accident costs.47 Tort liability forces actors to internalize the social costs
of their activities and, thereby, gives them an incentive to avoid incurring
these costs by engaging in safer conduct.48 In other words, individuals
and business entities who are “rational actors” will seek to avoid liability
by investing in safety and thereby reducing accident costs. But will they?
Unfortunately, not everyone behaves according to the rational actor
model. Professor Stephen Sugarman examined the effect of tort liability
on human behavior in an influential article entitled Doing Away with Tort
Law.49 First, Professor Sugarman pointed out that “[s]elf-preservation
instincts, market forces, personal morality and governmental regulation
combine to control unreasonably dangerous actions independently of tort
law.”50 Furthermore, he identified a number of factors that weakened the
44. See id. at 41.
45. If tort law does not significantly deter negligent conduct, gun-related deaths and injuries
will not be reduced as much as predicted. If this occurred, the benefit side of the risk-utility
equation would be correspondingly reduced.
46. See id. at 38.
47. See id.; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 865–72 (1981).
48. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1289 (1980).
49. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985).
50. Id. at 561.
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deterrent effects of tort liability for particular individuals. For example,
he observed that many people were ignorant of the liability rules that
affected them.51 In addition, both individuals and organizations often
suffered from what Professor Sugarman refers to as “incompetence.”52
On an individual level, this means inattention or lapses in judgment; at
the organizational level, it means the inability to formulate a strategy to
limit exposure to liability or to implement it throughout the organization’s
structure.53 According to Professor Sugarman, the deterrent effect of tort
law was further weakened by the fact that people often disregarded the
threat of liability.54 Another factor was the fact that some people were
willing to take chances, even though they realized that they are placing
others at risk, when they believed that these risks were necessary to
achieve some important goal.55 Furthermore, some people were not
deterred by tort liability because they felt that the risk of being held liable
was very low.56 Finally, some people were not deterred by tort liability
because they were judgment proof or because they were protected by
liability insurance.57
III. REGULATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TORT LIABILITY
If the benefits of reduced deaths and injuries from stolen guns
resulting from the threat of tort liability do not clearly outweigh the costs
of imposing such liability on gun owners and sellers, perhaps we should
consider whether some of these benefits can be achieved more cheaply
by imposing certain theft prevention measures by regulation instead of
relying on tort liability.
There are a number of reasons why government regulation is likely to
be cheaper and more efficient than tort liability.58 First of all, regulatory
standards are easier to understand ex ante because they are usually
specific.59 In contrast, tort rules tend to be open-ended and contextual in
nature.60 In the case of federal regulations, another advantage is they

51. See id. at 565–67.
52. Id. at 561, 568.
53. See id. at 568–69.
54. See id. at 569.
55. See id. at 570.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 571–74.
58. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437,
1468 (1994).
59. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Design: A
Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 638 (1978).
60. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55
MD. L. REV. 1210, 1262 (1996).
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apply uniformly throughout the country.61 Furthermore, regulatory
agencies typically have a number of effective enforcement powers to
enable them to enforce their rules and regulations,62 while the tort system
relies almost entirely on private individuals for enforcement.63 In
addition, when viewed broadly as a mechanism for risk control, the
“overhead” costs of a regulatory approach are likely to be less than the
costs of tort liability.64 While the costs of government regulation include
the cost of maintaining an agency staff, as well as the cost of formulating
and enforcing regulations, the costs of tort liability not only include the
cost of determining applicable tort law safety standards,65 but also the
cost of defending and adjudicating damage claims.66
If a regulatory route is chosen, an obvious place to start would be a
statutory authorization for the ATF to convert some or all of its existing
recommendations into binding regulations on gun sellers.67 Regulation of
gun owners at the federal level would be more problematic. Although a
federal gun safety law aimed at individual gun owners would no doubt be
more effective than state regulation, it would raise Second Amendment
concerns and would probably also generate considerable opposition from
the NRA and the rest of the “gun lobby.” Therefore, a more practical
approach would be to modify state CAP laws, currently found in at least
twenty-five states,68 and impose specific theft-prevention obligations on
gun owners.69 In fact, it might be possible for interested parties, including

61. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product
Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1988).
62. See Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (1989).
63. For example, the deterrent effect of tort law is weakened because many injured parties
fail to sue. See Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, “Tort Reform” and the Liability
“Revolution”: Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 251,
259 (1991–1992).
64. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437,
1450 (1994).
65. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product
Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1988).
66. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 363-64 (1984). Both plaintiffs and defendants bear these costs. According to one estimate,
the overhead costs of tort litigation are almost fifty cents on every dollar spent to pay claims. See
JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION
69 (1986).
67. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SAFETY AND SECURITY INFORMATION FOR FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEES 8–15 (2010) (discussed
in McClurg, supra note 1, at 19 n.89.
68. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 18 n.80.
69. Professor McClurg points out that current CAP laws do not require specific safety
measures, but merely make it a crime to negligently store a loaded firearm in a way that enables
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the NRA and other gun-oriented organizations, to formulate a uniform
gun safety law, which, if adopted, would help to avoid the problem of
disparate regulations at the state level.
CONCLUSION
Professor McClurg rightly points out that many gun owners and
sellers do not take adequate measures to protect against theft. This failure
contributes to gun-related deaths and injuries because stolen firearms are
often used in the commission of other crimes. Professor McClurg laments
the fact that current laws and court decisions have immunized gun owners
and sellers from liability in such cases and he proposes to remedy the
situation by imposing tort liability on those who negligently fail to
safeguard their weapons against theft. While this proposal has some
merit, a tort liability regime may not have a significant deterrent effect
and will be costly to administer. Consequently, I have suggested that a
regulatory approach should be considered instead. Existing ATF
recommendations could be made mandatory on commercial gun sellers
at the federal level, while gun safety measures could be enforced against
individual gun owners under state law.

a child to gain access to the weapon and cause harm to himself or another person. See id. at 18–
19.

